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I. Introduction
The Fourth Amendment explicitly provides “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures,”1 and further protects expectations of privacy if
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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an individual “‘exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy’”2 that society would accept as
“‘reasonable.’”3 When addressing privacy expectations
and communications, courts hold that, while the content
of communications may be eligible for such protection,4
information relating to the transfer of the
communication is not.5 The crux of United States v.
Carpenter is whether the location information the
government obtained from the defendants’ wireless
carriers’ records under the Stored Communications Act6
and subsequently used as evidence when prosecuting the
defendants for violations of the Hobbs Act 7 was protected
by the Fourth Amendment and therefore a warrantless
search.8
This issue is important because it is, essentially,
a decision to either characterize locational information
derived through wireless carriers’ records as subject to
Fourth Amendment protection under an expectation of
privacy9 or as information used to send a communication
and therefore ineligible for Fourth Amendment
protection.10 Such information could be deemed ineligible
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 886 (6th Cir.
2016) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967)) [hereinafter Carpenter I], rev’d and remanded by 138
S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) [hereinafter Carpenter II].
3 819 F.3d at 886 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
4 Id. at 886 (applying Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d) (2012)); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878)).
5 Carpenter I, 819 F.3d 886.
6 Id. at 884; see 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
7 Carpenter I, 819 F.3d at 884 (applying the Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951 (2012)).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 886-87 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.; Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
10 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886-87 (quoting Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878); Smith, 442 U.S. at 743).
2
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for Fourth Amendment protection as information used to
send a communication because locational records are the
result of technology used to transmit cellphone signals11
and the general public is aware that wireless carriers use
location data to provide service.12 However, customers’
locational information could arguably qualify for Fourth
Amendment protection under an expectation of privacy
depending on the accuracy of the location data and the
length of location monitoring.13 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed that location records tracked through
the provision of cellular service did not qualify for Fourth
Amendment protections;14 however, the Supreme Court
granted a petition for certiorari15 and found that the
records were protected by the Fourth Amendment under
an expectation of privacy and that the government’s
acquisition of such records was a warrantless search.16
II. Analysis
At first impression, the Sixth Circuit’s affirmation
that the government’s acquisition of location records
collected in the course of a business providing cellphone
service was not a search because such records were not
protected under the Fourth Amendment17 may appear to
align with the status quo. The court addressed the
application of the widely accepted test for determining
Id. at 885.
Id. at 888.
13 Id. at 888–89 (applying United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
14 Id. at 890.
15 Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d and remanded
by 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
16 United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018),
rev’ g 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016).
17 Carpenter I, 819 F.3d at 890.
11
12
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whether information is protected by an expectation of
privacy as held in Katz v. United States,18 which the
Supreme Court has applied in a number of cases,
including Smith v. Maryland.19 This court determined
that Smith was controlling precedent in the instant case
and characterized location data recorded when providing
cellphone service as analogous to the phone numbers
referenced in Smith.20 A cornerstone of the court’s
discussion of this analogy was testimony as to the
imprecise nature of the cellphone location data.21 If
cellphone service location data continues to be notably
imprecise, then the court’s lack of concern over the
privacy expectations related to this information would be
expected and would carry no further implications.
However, as Justice Stranch’s concurring opinion22 and
subsequent Supreme Court decision23 suggest, the
rapidly advancing nature of technology and the
importance of cellphone use in modern life suggest that
cellphone location data is no longer comparable to a
record of phone numbers dialed and is, in fact, entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection due to an expectation of
privacy.24 The Supreme Court’s decision,25 by extension,
suggests that going forward, existing case law pertaining
to technology and expectations of privacy should be
reconsidered in light of the evolving relationship between
society and pervasive technology.26
Id. at 886 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
20 Carpenter I, 819 F.3d at 888.
21 Id. at 889.
22 Id. at 894 (Stranch, J., concurring).
23 Carpenter II, 138 S. Ct. at 2206.
24 Id. at 2217; Carpenter I, 819 F.3d at 894–97.
25 Carpenter II, 138 S. Ct. 2206.
26 See id. at 2218 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
386 (2014)).
18
19
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If the Sixth Circuit’s decision that location data
recorded by cellphone service providers was not entitled
to Fourth Amendment protection27 had remained the
controlling case law, it would have carried ramifications
for a plethora of other information generated in the use
of cellphones and other common technologies. Extending
the line of reasoning employed in this decision,28
additional information associated with the delivery of
wireless service or other technological services would
potentially also not have Fourth Amendment protection.
Considering the ever-expanding role of technology in
communication, healthcare, entertainment, and more, a
strict application of acceptable expectations of privacy
and Fourth Amendment protections could lead to the
exposure of a wide range of personal information.29
The Supreme Court’s decision to accept an
expectation of privacy regarding location information
generated through the use of cellular service30 not only
allays these potential concerns but indicates that
stricter, traditional applications of privacy expectation
tests may fall by the wayside when applied to technologybased search issues. After all, “the court is obligated—as
‘[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading
Carpenter I, 819 F.3d at 890.
Id. at 896 (Stranch, J., concurring) (expressing “concern
about the applicability of a test that appears to admit to no
limitation on the quantity of records or the length of time for
which such records may be compelled” because “precedent
suggests the need to develop a new test to determine when a
warrant may be necessary under these or comparable
circumstances”).
29 See id. at 894 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring)).
30 Carpenter II, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (“[A]n individual maintains
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his
physical movements. . . .”).
27
28
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privacy have become available to the Government’—to
ensure that the ‘progress of science’ does not erode
Fourth Amendment protections.”31 How standards for
expectations of privacy will evolve in response to rapid
technological change remains to be seen; understandings
and expectations of the general public, academic
research, and public policy concerns will certainly all
contribute. Still, the Supreme Court’s willingness to
identify Fourth Amendment protection for the location
records in United States v. Carpenter32 highlights the
increased difficulty in maintaining federal courts’
longstanding reliance on the delineation between
communication content and information used to convey
communications33 to determine when an expectation of
privacy is “reasonable.”34 Moving forward, case law will
need to elaborate on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Carpenter35 and, in the meantime, society will need to be
wary about the extent to which one may reasonably
expect privacy and Fourth Amendment protections in the
realm of technology. It is also important to note that this
case was remanded and that the subsequent outcome
may add additional detail regarding how to apply the
opinion offered by the Supreme Court.36

Id. at 2223 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 473–74 (1928)).
32 Id. at 2206.
33 Carpenter I, 819 F.3d at 886.
34 Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
35 See generally Carpenter II, 138 S. Ct. 2206.
36 Id. at 2223.
31
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III. Conclusion
Through granting certiorari for this case37 and
reversing and remanding the holding of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals,38 the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the traditional approaches to Fourth Amendment
protections are not entirely congruent with modern
technological advances and society’s relationship with
technology.39 Although the Supreme Court’s holding
provided for Fourth Amendment protections for location
records collected by third-party service providers through
customers’ use of cellphones40 while the Sixth Circuit’s
holding did not,41 a significant amount of personal
information collected through various technologies and
service providers remains unaddressed. As a result,
users should exercise caution when harboring
expectations of privacy while the policy of providing
Fourth Amendment protections to personal information
recorded through new technological developments
undergoes further elaboration.

37 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016),
rev’d and remanded by 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
38 Carpenter II, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Carpenter I, 819 F.3d at 890.
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